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JUSTICE STORY CUTS THE GORDIAN KNOT
OF HUNG JURY INSTRUCTIONS
George C. Thomas H*
Mark Greenbaum*
INTRODUCTION
One persistent form of hubris is to think that modem law has evolved to be more
advanced and, thus, better than law in the past. The Bill of Rights is a brilliant
document, so the argument goes, but two hundred years of case law have developed
a more sophisticated, thoughtful, and better understanding of the rights created by
the Framers. The ultimate purpose of this Article is to demonstrate the that law
today not is always better than law in the past. We will make the argument in the
context of jury verdicts, with an emphasis on the law of hung juries. Judges in Justice
Joseph Story's day viewed hung juries in criminal cases as a highly disfavored out-
come. Today, judges routinely accept hung juries in criminal cases as the "cost of
doing business," in large part because of a fear that instructions designed to encour-
age verdicts might be held to be unduly coercive.
This Article will trace the legal development of the hung jury issue from Justice
Story's day to the present. In the process, we will highlight a little-noticed problem
with the case-by-case method of creating constitutional law. Law constructed this
way has a tendency to become more complex and less coherent as later cases try to
fit within prior precedents without overruling ones that do not fit very well. Over
time, this process can produce what we will call the "common law Gordian knot":
a doctrine so complex and inconsistent that it provides little guidance to judges and
often blinds them to the perversity of the way the doctrine works.' Our example will
be the law governing the instructions that judges are permitted to give juries when
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article and then recruit a student or former student to help execute the idea. In this case, how-
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We understand, of course, that constitutional law is not derived from the common law.
As we will argue in Part II, however, constitutional interpretation employs a common law
methodology.
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
panels announce a failure to reach a verdict. In our view, judges of Justice Story's
generation followed a far more salutary, and simpler, approach.
We argue that the Story era manifested more wisdom on this issue than the mod-
em doctrine. While we do not advocate imprisoning juries in unheated rooms with-
out food or drink-as was routinely done during Blackstone's era2-we do advocate
a paradigm shift in the attitude of judges. The right response to a deadlocked panel
should not be "mistrial" but rather a simple instruction, "please continue to deliberate."
We advocate, in sum, a return to the days of yesteryear when a mistrial was a rare
and disfavored outcome and juries were expected to return a verdict.
Part I briefly explains why it was critical in the early days of juries for the jury
to return a unanimous verdict. It begins with the thirteenth century view that juries
deliver perfect justice and brings most of the story as far as Blackstone. Part H pauses
to inquire into the problem of judicial coercion beginning with the William Penn
case from the seventeenth century, and it then explores how modem courts have em-
phasized fear of judicial coercion in deciding what instructions may be given to juries
to encourage a verdict. The modem doctrine is a textbook example of how the case-
by-case method of constructing law can produce a maddeningly complex and un-
satisfactory legal doctrine. This Part also briefly considers the frequency of hung
juries to ground the problem. Part III proposes a novel way to cut the Gordian knot
of current law on instructing hung juries, a solution that returns us to the elegance
of Justice Story's opinion for the Supreme Court in 1824.
I. JURIES REPLACE GOD
By A.D. 200, criminal juries had disappeared from Roman criminal procedure and
would not appear in Western law again until the eleventh century.3 This left various
forms of "the ordeal" as the only mechanism for determining guilt in the Western
world. Apparently developed by the Germanic tribes of central Europe, the ordeal
functioned to obtain God's view.4 One example Blackstone gives is of the fire ordeal:
Fire-ordeal was performed either by taking up in the hand, unhurt,
a piece of red hot iron, of one, two, or three pounds weight; or else
by walking, barefoot, and blindfold, over nine redhot plowshares,
2 See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 375 (Univ.
of Chicago Press, photo. reprint 1979) (1768) (discussing the measures that a judge could
undertake to force jurors to reach a verdict, such as being "kept without meat, drink, fire, or
candle... till they are all unanimously agreed").
3 2 JAMES LEIGH STRACHAN-DAVIDSON, PROBLEMS OF THE ROMAN CRIMINAL LAW 15 8
(1912). Inquests were used during part of this period as fact-finders or grand juries but not,
typically, to seek final proof of guilt. See 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM
MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 140-41 (Lawyers' Literary Club 1959) (2d ed.
1898).
4 GEORGE CRABB, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 27 (1829).
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laid lengthwise at unequal distances: and if the party escaped
being hurt, he was adjudged innocent; but if it happened other-
wise, as without collusion it usually did, he was then condemned
as guilty.
5
We need not describe other forms of the ordeal for they shared the same premise
important to our point about juries: the ordeal was viewed as infallible because it relied
on the judgment of God.6 As long as one were willing to believe that God would
intervene and that the priests who "judged" the order could perfectly ascertain God's
judgment, the ordeal never produced an incorrect or an ambiguous outcome.
Little wonder, then, that when English juries began to supplant the ordeal in the
twelfth century, a requirement of unanimity quickly took hold. For the jury was re-
placing a mechanism that, in theory, was perfect. As Pollock and Maitland put it:
Nor must it escape us that the justices are pursuing a course which
puts the verdict of the country on a level with the older modes
of proof. If a man came clean from the ordeal.., the due proof
would have been given; no one could have questioned the dictum
of Omniscience.7
A jury verdict of seven-to-five would hardly have seemed beyond question.
Moreover, the English jury was viewed as speaking for the community, and the
English community of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries had but one voice.8
Indeed, had the jury arisen later, a majority vote might have been sufficient to convict.
In France, where Voltaire was instrumental in the institution of juries, a vote of eight-
to-four today produces a conviction. 9 But in thirteenth century England, "as yet men
had not accepted the dogma that the voice of a majority binds the community."'
Whether it was the king, the grand jury, or the criminal jury, each institution had only
one voice. Again in the words of Pollock and Maitland, "[T]he voice of the twelve
men is deemed to be the voice of the country-side, often the voice of some... dis-
trict which is more than a district, which is a community."" In sum, "[t]he parties
to the litigation have 'put themselves' upon a certain test. That test is the voice of
5 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 337.
6 Id. at 336.
7 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 627.
8 See id. at 626.
9 CODE DE PROCtDURE PtNALE [C. PR. PaN.] art. 359 (Fr.), available at http://www
.legifrance.gouv.fr/html/codes traduits/CpptextA.htm (follow "Deliberations of the Assize
Court" hyperlink) ("Any decision unfavorable to the accused is taken by a majority of at least
eight votes ... in the first instance .... ).
i0 2 POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 3, at 626.
" Id. at624.
2007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
the country. Just as a corporation can have but one will, so a country can have but
,,12one voice.
For a time, defendants tended to resist juries, preferring the remnants of the ordeal
system that survived the Lateran Council's prohibition of clerics participating in the
ordeal.' 3 Parliament and the judges, however, preferred juries, and they reacted by
seeking to coerce defendants to choose juries. By 1275, a statute ordered "strong and
hard Imprisonment" of those who refused to answer an indictment by putting them-
selves on the country. 4 A later and more gruesome example is peine forte et dure
in which the "defendant was placed on the ground and stones were piled on his chest
until he either expired or groaned, '[clountry, country,' indicating his acceptance of
the jury of verdict."' 5
By the mid-fourteenth century, juries had become the normal and accepted way
to determine guilt, "and defendants were no longer asked to put themselves on the
country."' 16 The law about the role of jurors was, for a time, settled. Criminal defen-
dants were tried by juries, composed of twelve men, who were required to render a
verdict unanimously. 7
Very little changed over the next four hundred years. In 1791, Americans had so
much faith in the wisdom of local criminal juries that the initial failure to require local
juries threatened to doom the Constitution before its ultimate passage. 8 Article III
required juries in federal criminal cases, to be sure, but the trial could be held, and
thus the jury empaneled, in any court in the state.' 9 The strong feelings of the Anti-
Federalists about the important role of the jury can be seen in a speech Patrick Henry
made when opposing ratification of the Constitution:
Why do we love this trial by jury? Because it prevents the hand
of oppression from cutting you off. They may call any thing re-
bellion, and deprive you of a fair trial by an impartial jury of your
neighbors. Has not your mother country magnanimously pre-
served this noble privilege upwards of a thousand years?... That
country had juries of hundredors [local citizens] for many gen-
erations. And shall Americans give up that which nothing could
induce the English people to relinquish? The idea is abhorrent
to my mind. There was a time when we should have spumed at
it. This gives me comfort-that, as long as I have existence, my
12 Id. at 626.
'I Id. at 599.
14 Statute of Westminister the First, 1275, 3 Edw., c. 12 (Eng.).
'5 NORMAN F. CANTOR, IMAGINING THE LAW: COMMON LAW AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF
THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 129 (1997).
16 Id. at 130.
17 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 3, at 624-26.
" AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 233-35 (2005).
'9 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
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neighbors will protect me. Old as I am, it is probable I may yet
have the appellation of rebel. I trust that I shall see congressional
oppression crushed in embryo. As this government stands, I de-
spise and abhor it.... [I]t takes away the trial by jury in civil cases,
and does worse than take it away in criminal cases. It is gone
unless you preserve it now.20
The Anti-Federalists believed juries could reach more just outcomes than judges.2'
To reach those outcomes of course, juries must return a verdict. And the evidence from
the colonies is that juries always did return a verdict. We know, for example, that
no mistrials appeared in New Jersey criminal cases from 1749-57.22 This is not surpris-
ing because mistrials were not a recognized outcome in Blackstone' s Commentaries.
If an eighteenth century English jury did not reach a unanimous verdict before the
judge had to leave for the next town on his circuit, he could "carry them round the
circuit from town to town in a cart. 23 We suspect not many juries would refuse to
reach a unanimous verdict if the alternative was to be kept together and transported
by cart from town to town. Occasionally, as we will see, a brave jury would refuse to
reach a verdict, but these were outliers in the common law system.
The first report of a mistrial for failure to reach a verdict in an American court was
1807.24 As late as 1824, Justice Story could declare, for a unanimous Supreme Court
in United States v. Perez, that the power to declare a mistrial when the jury could not
reach a verdict "ought to be used with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances,
and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital cases especially, Courts should
be extremely careful how they interfere with any of the chances of life, in favour of
the prisoner. 2
5
The next hundred years would see a gradual evolution in the conception of the
jury's role. By the time we get to the middle of the twentieth century, Justice Story's
20 THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 438
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997).
21 GEORGE C. THoMAs I, BETRAYAL OF INNOCENCE: How THE SUPREME COURT
SACRIFICES INNOCENTDEFENDANTS (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at 164-66, on file with
author). This belief was based at least in part on the Anti-Federalists' experiences during the
Stamp Act Crisis of 1765, when trials for colonists who had not paid their taxes were con-
ducted without juries. See Eric Grant, A Revolutionary View of the Seventh Amendment and
the Just Compensation Clause, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 144, 153 (1996).
22 See George C. Thomas III, Colonial Criminal Law and Procedure: The Royal Colony
of New Jersey 1749-57, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 671,703-04 tbl. 1 (2005). While we have not
researched other colonies, nothing suggests a different approach because all colonies followed
the common law of England.
23 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 2, at 376; see also CRABB, supra note 4, at 287.
24 United States v. Workman, 28 F. Cas. 771,773 (D. La. 1807) (No. 16,764) (holding "that
the general doctrine prohibiting the discharge of ajury in all cases was erroneous and obsolete"
and that a jury could be discharged "when it is necessary to justice").
25 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
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concern in Perez that mistrials would interfere with the possibility of a favorable
outcome for the defendant-an acquittal-had been turned on its head. A mistrial
based on a hung jury had become a favorable outcome, one that potentially pro-
tected innocent defendants from being convicted. The theory was that, faced with
a hung jury, prosecutors would often concede defeat and not reprosecute. Hung jury
mistrials were no longer outliers, and judges were discouraged from exhorting juries
to continue deliberating.
The story of that evolution is largely a story of judges developing a concern about
coercing juries to reach a verdict. Judges in Blackstone's day were willing to cart
jurors from town to town until they reached a verdict. Modem judges flinch at the
prospect of asking jurors merely to continue deliberation.
II. THE FEAR OF JUDICIAL COERCION
The "hung jury" is a fairly straightforward concept. It is defined as "[a] jury that
cannot reach a verdict by the required voting margin. '"26 At common law, and in
almost all states today, criminal juries must reach their verdicts by a unanimous verdict.
Thus, a single stubborn or misinformed juror can "hang" a criminal jury even when the
evidence of guilt is manifest. The ultimate question, for the criminal justice system
as well as for this Article, is the extent to which judges can encourage a hung jury
to continue deliberating. One approach is that of the common law of Blackstone' s
day: simply keep the jury together until it reaches a verdict. A variation on that theme
can be found in the famous Bushel's Case.27
A. Seventeenth Century Judicial Coercion
Bushel's Case stemmed from another proceeding, the trial of the eventual founder
of Pennsylvania, William Penn, who was charged with sedition and attempting to
plant the seeds of rebellion against the English Crown through unlawful assembly
and disturbing the peace.28 Penn and his associate William Mead had addressed a
small group of fellow Quakers in London.29 In 1670, English persecution of Quakers
was near its peak, and Penn's peaceful speech was merely a pretext to pursue a high-
profile Quaker.3°
26 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 860 (7th ed. 1999).
27 (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P.D.); see also JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WETHEJJRY: THE
JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 68 (1994).
28 ABRAMSON, supra note 27, at 68-69 (noting that the exact charge was "preaching sedi-
tiously and causing a great tumult of people on the royal street to be there gathered together
riotously and routously").
29 Id.
30 JOHN GUNTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 24-25 (1988).
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At Penn's trial, three witnesses testified that they had seen Penn preaching in the
street, in violation of the law, but none of them had been able to hear what he had said.3'
Much of the other evidence presented was equally non-compelling. Nevertheless, the
case was submitted to the jury, and the court did not mince words in expressing what
verdict it expected. In summing up the case, the judge told the jury:
You have heard what the Indictment is, It is for preaching to the
people... there are three or four witnesses that have proved this,
that he did preach there... now we are upon the matter of fact,
which you are to keep to, and observe, as what hath been fully
sworn at your peril.
32
The jury then retired and deliberated for ninety minutes before returning to court and
declaring that it was deadlocked eight-to-four in favor of conviction on the most serious
charge of unlawful assembly.33 One alderman in the audience screamed at a juror he
knew, Edward Bushel, ranting that Bushel "deserve[d] to be indicted more than any
man that hath been brought to the bar this day," and the judge threatened Bushel that
he would be branded unless the jury promptly found Penn and Mead guilty of un-
lawful assembly.'M The judge sent the jury back to deliberate, and the panel returned,
finding Penn and Mead guilty of the lesser charge of preaching but not guilty of un-
lawful assembly.35 It repeated these findings thirty minutes later after being forced
to reconsider.
3 6
Nearly berserk with anger at this announcement, the court recorder ordered that
the jury be locked in the jury room "without meat, drink, fire and tobacco," until they
reached a proper verdict on the unlawful assembly charge.37 The next day, the jury
refused to relent, and this time, the judge threatened to cut Bushel's throat.3' Finally,
on the day after that, the judge accepted the jury's not guilty verdict as to the unlawful
assembly charge but fined each juror forty marks. 39 All of the jurors initially refused
to pay the fine. The court promptly sent them to Newgate Prison, ironically where
both Penn and Mead had been sent.4° Bushel and three others remained steadfast
and appealed their fines to the Court of Common Pleas, which, nearly a year after
31 ABRAMSON, supra note 27, at 69.
32 Id. at 71 (emphasis added).
33 Id.
34 GUINTHER, supra note 30, at 26.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. (noting that the recorder further told the jury that "[y]ou shall not... thus ... abuse the
court, we will have a verdict by the help of God, or you shall starve for it" (omissions in original)).
38 Id.
31 Id. at 27.
40 id.
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Penn's trial had ended, invalidated the fines.4 ' Speaking through Chief Justice Sir John
Vaughan, the court found that a trial court could never punish a juror for his verdict.42
While Bushel's Case demonstrates the need for limits on judicial coercion, it im-
parts no lesson about the precise line to be drawn between appropriate encouragement
and judicial coercion. We turn now to this issue.
B. The Common Law Gordian Knot
The grandeur of the common law is that it is an evolving judicial creation, almost
a living thing. No case falls outside the purview of the common law. Common law
judges can rely on moral philosophy, on prior cases, on logic, and on common sense
to decide any issue that comes before them. Past cases demonstrate this flexibility.
In 1682, the Chancery established a rule permitting land to be made inalienable for the
lifetime of someone who inherited the property---the beginning of the Rule Against
Perpetuities.43 The court lacked authority for its holding. When asked "[w]here will
you stop" in permitting land to be kept inalienable, the best Lord Nottingham could
do was say, "I will tell you where I will stop: I will stop where-ever any visible Incon-
venience doth appear.""4
For another example, consider The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens.4 1 In 1884,
the Queen's Bench ruled that the imminent death of three shipwrecked sailors would
not justify killing the weakest sailor so the others could feed on his body and live.46
Because there was no precedent, Chief Justice Coleridge relied on Bracton, Lord Hale,
and other legal authorities in finding that necessity to save one's life could never be
a defense to murder.47
In the famous American case of Pierson v. Post,4" an early New York court had
to decide whether pursuing a fox reduced it to the possession of the pursuer. There
were no American precedents and all the English precedents relied on English stat-
utes.49 With legal precedents thus unavailable, the common law court could turn to
sources as exotic and diverse as Justinian, Puffendorf, Fleta, Bynkershoek, Grotius,
and treatise writers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to decide that pursuit
is not possession.5"
41 Id.
42 Id.
4' The Duke of Norfolk's Case, (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.).
4 Id. at 960.
45 (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 273, 288.
46 id.
47 Id. at 281-88 (citing to Lord Hale, Bracton, Sir Michael Foster, Serjeant Hawkins, Dalton,
and Staundforde, while rejecting Lord Bacon's possible contention that necessity was a legal
defense to murder).
48 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805).
49 Id. at 177-78.
" See id. at 177-80.
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But the very flexibility of the common law approach can be its own worst enemy.
Judges seek to decide new cases consistently with the precedents, rather than over-
rule them, which tends to create a doctrine of ever finer distinctions. This tradition
was necessary, of course, in an age when the law came only from judges. If later
judges are free to decide the same issue differently from earlier judges, then one does
not have "law" in any coherent sense. Judges would be acting as mini-legislatures.
Ronald Dworkin has given a name to the way judges use precedent: law as "in-
tegrity.""1 Dworkin envisions judges deciding each new case consistently with "the
principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best con-
structive interpretation of the community's legal practice. '"2 Those principles, of
course, include all the relevant case law. Law as integrity thus requires judges to at-
tempt to fit the prior cases into the decision they reach and the opinion they write.
Dworkin's arresting metaphor for this process is a chain novel.53 Each of the prior
chapters in the novel has been written by a different judge.54 Each successive judge
"must try to make this the best novel it can be," one that will be "construed as the work
of a single author rather than, as is the fact, the product of many different hands."55
The interpretive enterprise requires a series of judgments about how best to under-
stand what has come before. If possible, the judge must make her chapter fit the
preceding chapters. It is only when that proves impossible that she will abandon the
effort.56 Then the judge must begin a new novel. At that juncture she must overrule
precedent, but only after she has considered every interpretation that might make the
novel-the law-coherent.57
Dworkin's theory has great explanatory power. It explains why law grows ever
more complex. Supreme Court justices have, on occasion, noted and criticized this
trend. Justice Clarence Thomas called the ever-growing complexity of constitutional
law in the late twentieth century, "a regrettable development, for the law draws force
from the clarity of its command and the certainty of its application. As the complexity
of legal doctrines increases, moreover, so too does the danger that their foundational
principles will become obscured."58 Somewhat more colorful is Justice Antonin
Scalia's description of a recent development in the Supreme Court's confessions
doctrine as "the latest stage of prophylaxis built upon prophylaxis, producing a veri-
table fairyland castle of imagined constitutional restriction upon law enforcement."59
Castles, fairyland and otherwise, are in danger of collapsing if built too tall, as Justice
Robert Jackson wisely observed in Douglas v. City of Jeannette: "This Court is forever
5' See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986).
52 Id. at 225.
51 Id. at 229.
54 Id.
55 Id.
16 Id. at 230-31.
17 Id. at 230.
58 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 669 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
" Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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adding new stories to the temples of constitutional law, and the temples have a way
of collapsing when one story too many is added."'
Constitutional law is not, of course, technically common law because it is based
on a text, but constitutional interpretation is based on the common law method. 6' The
Court is led to "new stories to the temples" in constitutional law because the text is
usually sufficiently expansive that it answers only a small, and often trivial, subset of
questions, thus inviting reliance on the "common law" of constitutional precedents.
For example, the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures62answers zero ques-
tions, in the absence of some further definition of "reasonable," and this is the reason
Fourth Amendment law teeters on the verge of incoherence. The Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments 63 answers a small number of questions.
It would not permit convicted defendants to be drawn and quartered or have their body
parts cut off. Beyond that, however, the Eighth Amendment tells us almost nothing.
Consequently, as modem legislatures are not likely to mandate drawing and quarter-
ing or mutilation as a punishment, the difficult real-life Eighth Amendment issues
are left without a useful text to provide guidance.
When the common law Gordian knot becomes fully complete, law becomes so
complex, inconsistent, and opaque that each case becomes its own self-contained rule.
As law twists itself closer and closer into a fully complete Gordian knot, it begins to
lose generalizable rules that have "bite," though courts will surely trot out platitudi-
nous verbiage and claim that it is following some rule or other. No better example of
this phenomenon exists than the Fourth Amendment.6' One rule seems to exist, the one
governing searches and seizures inside the home. The rule is that a warrant is required.
But a moment's reflection discloses so many exceptions to the rule that even it has
little "bite." Evidence found and seized in a home is admissible without a valid search
warrant if any one of the following exceptions can be made out: (1) the owner con-
sented,65 (2) the police reasonably believed that the owner consented, 66 (3) the police
reasonably believed that the entry and search was justified by exigent circumstances,67
(4) the police made a good faith effort to obtain a valid warrant, 68 (5) the evidence
60 319 U.S. 157, 181 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring).
61 See DWORKIN, supra note 51, at 355-99 (applying law as integral to constitutional
interpretation).
62 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure.. . against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
63 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
64 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
65 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
6 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
67 There are a host of situations that fit the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant
requirement. See, e.g., Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
6 Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984).
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would have been inevitably found if the police had not searched and seized when
they did,69 (6) the person seeking to have the evidence suppressed was not the owner
of the home or an overnight occupant,7° or (7) the search was not conducted by or on
behalf of a state or federal actor.7 Similar exceptions exist for arrests made inside
the home without a warrant. Indeed, the police can search a person arrested in the
home without a warrant if they first take him outside the home and then search him
"incident to arrest" under the "search incident to a lawful arrest" exception.
72
While the "rule" about warrants being necessary for searches and seizures in a
home is pretty porous, at least it can be articulated as a rule. What can we say about
searches outside the home? For decades, the Supreme Court's approach was that
"searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-subject only
to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. 73 This platitude has
been criticized as vacuous over the last decade. Justice Scalia, for example, has noted
that the "few" exceptions actually amount to almost twenty.74 The Court, perhaps em-
barrassed by the criticisms from its own members as well as many commentators,75
has stopped claiming that a search warrant preference is the rule outside the home.
But then what is the rule? Is it merely that a search or seizure must be reasonable?
That is Justice Scalia's explicit position.76 This approach would be a completed
Gordian knot, but so far the Court has not embraced it. Instead, the Court examines
each case to see how it fits with precedent. As each precedent gets hemmed in on
all sides by later cases, it becomes narrower and narrower. Soon, perhaps the Fourth
Amendment outside the home will become a complete Gordian knot with courts asking
only whether the search or seizure was reasonable. In the meantime, it is close enough
to a complete Gordian knot to prompt commentators to compare Fourth Amendment
law to a tarbaby 77 or an ocean liner that is "rudderless and badly off course. 78
69 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
70 Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990); see
also Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (holding that one can contest a search or seizure
only when it violated her own reasonable expectation of privacy).
"' Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921).
72 See New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990) (holding that failure to have warrant to
arrest Harris inside his home did not taint otherwise lawful investigation techniques con-
ducted after leaving the home because Fourth Amendment violation ends when privacy of
home is no longer violated).
13 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
7' California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565,582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in thejudgment).
7' See, e.g., Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV.
1468 (1985).
76 See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 583.
77 Bradley, supra note 75, at 1468 ('The fourth amendment is the Supreme Court's tarbaby:
a mass of contradictions and obscurities that has ensnared the 'Brethren' in such a way that
every effort to extract themselves only finds them more profoundly stuck.").
78 Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 759
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Now, what of the right to a jury trial, which is the constitutional text at issue in
the hung jury cases? The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... 79
This right, unlike the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures and cruel and
unusual punishments, is at one level about as determinate as words can be. Defen-
dants must be tried by a panel of people who are not judges. However, what does the
right to trial by jury say about the content of instructions given to juries who cannot
reach agreement? The answer: nothing. As a result, courts have had to create a doc-
trine from nothing, and the result is roughly on par with the Court's doctrine of unrea-
sonable search and seizure. It is a Gordian knot that can be generously characterized
as complex and inconsistent. It can be less charitably described as incoherent.
C. Modem Judicial Coercion in Charging Juries to Continue Deliberations
The days of overt coercion in the mold of Bushel's Case have long since passed.
In their place remains the so-called "dynamite charge" from the Allen v. United States'
line of cases, a charge that is given to hung juries as a supplemental instruction in hopes
of untangling deadlock. While the central aim of the charge has not changed substan-
tially since it was first enunciated by the Court in 1896, Allen is in need of replace-
ment because it has twisted itself into a Gordian knot. Reflecting on this dilemma, the
American Bar Association wrote, with only a bit of hyperbole: "[T]here is not merely
one Allen charge, but an infinite number of variations of the charge, in current use. ' 81
These variations are heavily watered-down, long-winded versions of the original
1896 charge. Thus, trial courts face a seemingly endless sea of confusing supple-
mental charges that often provide more fodder for appeals than guidance to dead-
locked jury panels.82
While some concerns about general supplemental instructions began to ap-
pear not long after Allen's creation, 3 many state and federal courts continued to use
(1994) ("Fourth Amendment case law is a sinking ocean liner-rudderless and badly off
course-yet most scholarship contents itself with rearranging the deck chairs.").
79 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
80 The charge is derived from Allen v. United States (Allen II1), 164 U.S. 492 (1896).
11 ABA PROJEr ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDs RELATING TO TRIAL
BY JURY 155 (1968) cited in 2A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERALPRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 502, at 538 n.24 (3d ed. 2000); see also Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung
Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 VA. L. REv. 123, 125 (1967) [hereinafter Due
Process] ("The progeny of Allen have displayed endless permutations .. ").
82 For a history ofAllen's development, see Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831,835-39 (Alaska
1971), overruled by State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1987), and State v. Marsh, 490
P.2d 491, 494-97 (Or. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 974 (1972).
83 Cf. Peterson v. United States, 213 F. 920, 924 (9th Cir. 1914) (making no mention of
Allen but invalidating use of an unduly coercive deadlock charge); see also Stewart v. United
States, 300 F. 769, 782-88 (8th Cir. 1924); State v. Pyle, 57 P.2d 93, 99 (Kan. 1936); Eikmeier
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it." However, the legal landscape changed when widespread complaints aboutAllen
began to appear." For the most part, the complaints consisted of the same general
objection that Allen is inherently coercive. Amid this groundswell, dozens of courts
began to modify or ban the Allen charge.86 The ABA even joined the fray, formally
recommending that "the Allen charge should not be used' 87 and then writing stan-
dards for modified supplemental instructions that many courts have since adopted
in place of Allen.88
v. Bennett, 57 P.2d 87 (Kan. 1936); Gary B. Ferguson, Comment, An Argument for the
Abandonment of the Allen Charge in California, 15 SANTA CLARA LAW. 939, 939 n.3 (1975).
" See People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997, 1001 (Cal. 1977) ("Nevertheless, the Allen charge
won relatively quick adoption in some 10 states .... Undoubtedly the popularity of the in-
struction stemmed from its perceived efficiency as a means of 'blasting' a verdict out of a
deadlocked jury in a manner which had the imprimatur of the highest court in the land."); see
also Huffman v. United States, 297 F.2d 754,756-59 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 955 (1962).
85 Many of the articles exploring Allen came out in the early 1970s, mostly student-written.
Most of them condemn Allen to one degree or another and support the ABA standards. See,
e.g., Matthew M. Barasch, Criminal Procedure: Antideadlock Jury Instructions in the District
of Columbia, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 1179 (1986); Paul Marcus, The Allen Instruction in Criminal
Cases: Is the Dynamite Charge About to Be Permanently Defused?, 43 Mo. L. REV. 613
(1978); Note, The Allen Charge Dilemma, 10 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 637 (1972); Note, The
Allen Charge: Recurring Problems and Recent Developments, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296 (1972);
James R. Chadderdon, Note, Supplemental Charge to a Deadlocked Jury in a Criminal Trial
Urging Dissenters to Reevaluate Their Position in Light of the Majority's View Is Proper if the
Charge Contains No Biased Comments and Warns Jurors to Make Their Own Decision, 4
Hous. L. REV. 292 (1966); Comment, Criminal Law-Jury Instructions-ABA Jury Instruction
Adopted as Preferable to Allen Charge, 25 VAND L. REV. 246 (1972); Michael J. Crowley,
Comment, Jury Coercion in Capital Cases: How Much Risk Are We Willing to Take?, 57 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1073 (1989); Note, Deadlocked Juries and Dynamite: A Critical Look at the
"Allen Charge," 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 386 (1964) [hereinafter Deadlocked Juries]; Due Process,
supra note 81; Raymond C. Groneman, Comment, The Faltering Allen Charge andIts Proposed
Replacement, 16 ST. Louis U. L.J. 619 (1972); Mike Hennessey, Comment, The Allen Charge:
Dead Law a Long Time Dying, 6 U.S.F. L. REV. 326 (1972); Earl Ledford, Comment, Defusing
the Dynamite Charge: A Critique of Allen and Its Progeny, 36 TENN. L. REV. 749 (1969); Note,
On Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 78 YALE L.J. 100 (1968); B. Newal Squyres, Jr. & Arliss
M. Champlin, Comment, Instructing Deadlocked Juries: The Present Status of the Allen Charge,
3 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 313 (1972); David M. Stanton, Note, United States v. Arpan: How
Does the Dynamite Charge Affect Jury Determinations?, 35 S.D. L. REV. 461 (1990); Note,
Supplemental Jury Charges Urging a Verdict-The Answer Is Yet to Be Found, 56 MINN. L.
REV. 1199 (1972); Judith A. Warshawsky, Case Comment, The Allen Charge: The Propriety
of Giving Supplemental Instructions to a Deadlocked Jury, 22 Loy. L. REV. 667 (1975).
86 See 2A WRIGHT, supra note 81, § 502, at 537-43 nn.21-30.
87 3 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §15-4.4, at 15-143 (2d ed. 1980).
88 Id. For a summary of many of the ABA's prior recommendations as to the Allen charge,
see Note, Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge, 37 ME. L. REV. 167, 171-72 (1985). The
standards set out by the ABA are as follows:
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We first describe the Allen Gordian knot in state and federal law before recom-
mending a way to cut through the knot and begin anew.
D. Origins and Development of the Dynamite Charge
Allen v. United States represented the Supreme Court's first substantive attempt
to craft an instruction to be given to juries unable to reach a unanimous verdict. In
Allen, the defendant was charged with murder.8 9 His first and second federal trials
ended in conviction, but both convictions were reversed by the Supreme Court.9° A
third murder trial was commenced against Allen in 1895. At that proceeding, after the
case was submitted to the jury, the panel reported to the court that it was deadlocked
and requested instructions.9' Eager to help the panel reach a verdict because this was,
after all, the third trial of Allen, the trial judge issued an instruction to the jury that was
taken nearly verbatim from Commonwealth v. Tuey,92 an 1851 Massachusetts state
court decision that examined a similar supplemental jury instruction:
5.4 Length of Deliberations; deadlocked jury.
(a) Before the jury retires for deliberation, the court may give an
instruction which informs the jury:
(i) that in order to return a verdict, each juror must agree
thereto;
(ii) that jurors have a duty to consult with one another and
to deliberate with a view to reaching an agreement, if it
can be done without violence to individual judgment;
(iii) that each juror must decide the case for himself, but
only after an impartial consideration of the evidence with
his fellow jurors;
(iv) that in the course of deliberations, a juror should not
hesitate to reexamine his own views and change his opin-
ion if convinced it is erroneous; and
(v) that no juror should surrender his honest conviction
as to the weight or effect of the evidence solely because
of the opinion of his fellow jurors, or for the mere pur-
pose of returning a verdict.
(b) If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree,
the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and
may give or repeat an instruction as provided in subsection (a). The
court shall not require or threaten to require the jury to deliberate
for an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable intervals.
(c) The jury may be discharged without having agreed upon a verdict
if it appears that there is no reasonable probability of agreement.
ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 81, § 5.4, at 145-46.
89 Allen v. United States (Allen 1), 150 U.S. 551, 551 (1893).
9 Id.; Allen v. United States (Allen 11), 157 U.S. 675 (1895).
91 Allen v. United States (Allen 111), 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896).
9 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1 (1851).
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[I]n a large proportion of cases absolute certainty could not be
expected; that although the verdict must be the verdict of each in-
dividual juror, and not a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of
his fellows, yet they should examine the question submitted with
candor and with a proper regard and deference to the opinions of
each other; that it was their duty to decide the case if they could
conscientiously do so; that they should listen, with a disposition
to be convinced, to each other's arguments; that, if much the larger
number were for conviction, a dissenting juror should consider
whether his doubt was a reasonable one which made no impres-
sion upon the minds of so many men, equally honest, equally in-
telligent with himself. If, upon the other hand, the majority was
for acquittal, the minority ought to ask themselves whether they
might not reasonably doubt the correctness of a judgment which
was not concurred in by the majority.93
The jury thereafter continued deliberations and promptly convicted Allen. 94
The Supreme Court affirmed Allen's murder conviction, holding that the trial
court's instruction was not impermissible:
While, undoubtedly, the verdict of the jury should represent the
opinion of each individual juror, it by no means follows that
opinions may not be changed by conference in the jury-room.
The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a
comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors them-
selves. It certainly cannot be the law that each juror should not
listen with deference to the arguments and with a distrust of his
own judgment, if he finds a large majority of the jury taking a
different view of the case from what he does himself. It cannot
be that each juror should go to the jury-room with a blind deter-
mination or, that he should close his ears to the arguments of men
who are equally honest and intelligent as himself. There was no
error in these instructions.9"
In the century since Allen was handed down, the Court has said very little about
the permissibility of supplemental jury instructions to deadlocked panels. In a brief,
one-page opinion, the Court held in Jenkins v. United States that a judge could not
9' Allen 111, 164 U.S. at 501; see also Tuey, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 1.
94 Allen II, 164 U.S. at 493.
9' Id. at 501-02.
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tell a deadlocked jury, "'You have got to reach a decision in this case. ,,96 The Court
reasoned that this instruction was overly coercive and could have forced the jury into
reaching a unanimous verdict.97 Similarly, in Brasfield v. United States, the Court
ruled that the trial judge could not ask a deadlocked jury of its numerical split, holding
that such an inquiry would "be regarded as ground for reversal. 98 The Court con-
cluded that disclosing the breakdown of a deadlocked jury would place undue coercion
on those in the minority.99
In Lowenfield v. Phelps, the Court in 1988 expressly reaffirmed Allen, noting that
"[t]he continuing validity of this Court's observations in Allen are beyond dispute."' 10
Lowenfield upheld the use of an Allen charge, in conjunction with two jury polls by
the trial judge inquiring if further deliberations would be useful during the sentenc-
ing phase of a capital murder trial.'01 The Court declined to apply Jenkins, finding
that the language the trial judge had used in Jenkins was much stronger than that
which the judge used in his supplemental instruction in Lowenfield.1°2 The Court
also rejected the defendant's reliance on Brasfield, noting that the jury polls were
not of the panel's vote on the ultimate issue-the defendant's sentence-but merely
of each juror's belief of whether further deliberations would be useful in helping
reach a unanimous verdict. 103
Thus, Allen charges are still constitutional. But long before Lowenfield, courts
had begun to retreat from Allen for fear that even the relatively mild Allen charge
was coercive."
96 380 U.S. 445,446 (1965) (per curiam). For a transcript of the trial judge's instruction,
see Jenkins v. United States, 330 F.2d 220,221 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting),
rev'd, 380 U.S. 445 (1965).
" Jenkins, 380 U.S. at 446.
98 272 U.S. 448, 449-50 (1926). After the jury indicated it was deadlocked, the judge
inquired as to the numerical breakdown of the split, and the jury reported it was nine-to-
three. Id. at 449. Soon thereafter, the jury found the defendant guilty. Id.
99 Id.; see also Due Process, supra note 81, at 131 n.43. The issue of whether the trial
court may inquire into the numerical breakdown of a deadlocked jury is itself an important
issue. For a breakdown of the relevant case law, see George R. Priest, Annotation, Propriety
and Prejudicial Effect of Trial Court's Inquiry as to Numerical Division ofJury, 77 A.L.R.3d
769, 777-94 (1977).
100 484 U.S. 231,237 (1988). The Court has reinforced this view at other times. See, e.g.,
Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 382 & n.5 (1999).
10l Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 241.
102 Id. at 239 ('The difference between the language used there and the language used in
the present case is sufficiently obvious to show the fallacy of petitioner's reliance.").
103 Id. at 239-40.
104 See United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1163 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 991 (1978) ("A single Allen charge, without more, stands at the brink of impermissible
coercion.... We conclude that as a sound rule of practice it is reversible error to repeat an
Allen charge. .. ").
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E. The Modem Law of Dynamite Charges
Lacking effective guidance from the Supreme Court, many jurisdictions have
adopted different sets of guidelines for deadlock charges.'0 5 While some of the pro-
cedures are quite similar to each other, all of them are intricate. As a result, each trial
court is left to give its own different charge and hope that it conforms to whatever
variation the court of appeals decides to apply. An examination of the landscape of
the federal circuit courts discloses the vagaries in the law of Allen charges. 1°6
1. Allen Dynamite in the Federal Circuits 7
By the 1960s, several judges on the federal Courts of Appeals were openly won-
dering whether Allen's language might force jurors to abandon their beliefs to come
to a unanimous verdict.'08 Over time, federal appeals courts began to approve modified
" The tremendous outgrowth of Allen modifications and alternative versions was apparent
as early as the 1960s. See Kent v. United States, 343 F.2d 247,261 n.22 (D.C. Cir. 1964), rev'd
on other grounds, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) ("The designation of 'an Allen charge' has tended to
become an over-simplification since, as might be expected, the express words before the
Supreme Court in the Allen case have, in the intervening years, been frequently rearranged
or altered, with resulting variations in emphasis or impact."); see also State v. Thomas, 342
P.2d 197 (Ariz. 1959); State v. Randall, 353 P.2d 1054, 1057-58 (Mont. 1960). In its early
rejection of Allen, the Arizona Supreme Court made a prescient observation:
It now appears that [Allen's] continued use will result in an endless
chain of decisions, each link thereof tempered and forged with varying
facts and circumstances and welded with ever-changing personalities
of the appellate court. This is not in keeping with sound justice ....
We are convinced that the evils far outweigh the benefits, and decree
that its use shall no longer be tolerated and approved by this court.
Thomas, 342 P.2d at 200.
"o See generally 1A KEVIN F. O'MALLEY, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS:
CRIMINAL § 20.08 (5th ed. 2000) (providing supplemental instructions for juries that do not
reach a timely agreement).
107 For a fuller discussion of the case law in each of the circuits, see Wayne F. Foster,
Annotation, Modem Status of Rule that Court May Instruct Dissenting Jurors in Federal
Criminal Case to Give Due Consideration to Opinion of Majority (Allen Charge), 44 A.L.R.
Fed. 468, 475-79 (1979).
108 See Jenkins v. United States, 330 F.2d 220, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Wright, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Allen charge was "condemned" and advocating for its abolition); Huffman
v. United States, 297 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1962) (Brown, J., dissenting) ("The fact is that
in many phases of criminal law we have come a long, long way since 1896. There is no longer
any place for the Allen charge."); Speak v. United States, 161 F.2d 562,565 (10th Cir. 1947)
("The propriety of an instruction such as we have under consideration must be determined
from whether it had a tendency to coerce the jurors in their deliberations so that the verdict
which they ultimately reached and returned into court was not truly their own, but was brought
about in part by coercion from the court."); see also United States v. Kenner, 354 F.2d 780,
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dynamite charges that were filled with "balancing language."' 9 The new charges
addressed all members of a panel and did not implore jurors in the minority to re-
consider their views. 0 By addressing the entire panel, many courts believed, the trial
judge would not give jurors in the minority the impression that the court was singling
out only them."' Failure to include balancing language to this effect was gradually
found to constitute per se coercion by many courts."
2
The First Circuit uses this cautious approach in dealing with deadlocked juries.
In United States v. Nichols, the First Circuit articulated a three-prong standard for
determining whether a district court's dynamite charge was proper." 3 Later, the
court of appeals held that the "district court should instruct jurors in substance that
(1) members of both the majority and the minority should reexamine their positions,
(2) a jury has the right to fail to agree, and (3) the burden of proving guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt remains with the government."'" 4 Failure to follow these three
requirements, the First Circuit noted, would require reversal of a defendant's con-
viction."' Further, when the jury indicates that it is deadlocked, the judge must tell
the jurors that they will not be expected to deliberate indefinitely until a unanimous
verdict is reached." 6 This watered-down Allen charge seeks to ensure that no undue
pressure is ever placed on a deadlocked jury.
783-84 (2d Cir. 1965) ("We have had grave doubt as to whether the charge thus given was
not unduly coercive."), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966); Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d
735, 739-41 (5th Cir. 1965) (Coleman, J., concurring) ("I cannot see that the qualifications,
reservations, and escape clauses customarily used in modem versions of the [Allen] charge save
it from being what it is, and what the jury believes it to be, a direct appeal from the Bench for
a verdict."), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 958 (1966); Green v. United States, 309 F.2d 852, 854-56
(5th Cir. 1962) ("There is small, if any, justification for its use.").
"o See Due Process, supra note 81, at 129; see also Thaggard, 354 F.2d at 739. But see
Fulwood v. United States, 369 F.2d 960, 962 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (holding that an unbalanced
instruction to deadlocked jury was not per se coercive), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 934 (1967).
"o Fulwood, 369 F.2d at 962.
.. See, e.g., United States v. Manning, 79 F.3d 212 (1st Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
853 (1996).
12 See Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1961).
113 820 F.2d 508, 512 (1st Cir. 1987). The elements of the test were first described in
United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880, 883 (1st Cir. 1971).
"4 Manning, 79 F.3d at 222 (citing United States v. Angiulo, 485 F.2d 37,39 (1st Cir. 1973)).
"5 See United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d 193, 197-98 (lst Cir. 1998) ("In situations
where the substance of these elements was not communicated to the jury, this court has found
reversible error without further inquiry.").
116 See Manning, 79 F.3d at 223. The court of appeals has also held that while giving mul-
tiple modified Allen charges is not forbidden, the court should strongly avoid doing so. United
States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1304 (1st Cir. 1997) (warning that "[a] successive charge
tends to create a greater degree of pressure" on jurors), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1021 (1997);
see also Flannery, 451 F.2d at 883 ("This charge has been called the dynamite charge. Like
dynamite, it should be used with great caution, and only when absolutely necessary.").
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The Eighth Circuit has endorsed a similar balanced instruction, urging that supple-
mental charges be given to deadlocked panels with "great care." 1 7 The Eighth Circuit
defined five factors that a court should examine to determine if a charge is permissible:
a recognition that a majority of jurors may favor acquittal, that the
government has the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
that both the majority and minority should reexamine their views,
that the jurors should not abandon conscientiously held views,
and that the jury was free to deliberate as long as necessary."'
An earlier panel of the Eighth Circuit had created another test for coerciveness which
examined four factors: "(1) the content of the challenged instruction, (2) the length
of the period of deliberations following the Allen charge, (3) the total time of delib-
eration, and (4) any indicia in the record of coercion or pressure upon the jury."' 9 Like
the Eighth Circuit, the Tenth Circuit allows a modified Allen charge, but it strongly
advises its district courts to give the charge as part of the final instructions to the
jury and not when the jury first becomes deadlocked. 2° In examining a charge for
coerciveness, the Tenth Circuit looks at the language of the instruction, its timing,
the simultaneous issuance of other instructions, and the length of the time that the
jury deliberated after hearing the instruction before rendering a verdict. 121
The Fourth Circuit has also identified numerous factors that are relevant in a
coercion inquiry, including:
the charge in its entirety and in context; suggestions or threats
that the jury would be kept until unanimity is reached; sugges-
tions or commands that the jury must agree; indications that the
trial court knew the numerical division of the jury; indications
that the charge was directed at the minority; the length of delib-
erations following the charge; the total length of deliberations;
whether the jury requested additional instruction; and other indi-
cations of coercion. 12
2
"7 United States v. Young, 702 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1983).
"1 United States v. Robinson, 953 F.2d 433,436 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Potter v. United
States, 691 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir. 1982)).
"9 United States v. Webb, 816 F.2d 1263, 1266 (8th Cir. 1987) (quoting United States v.
Smith, 635 F.2d 716, 721 (8th Cir. 1980)).
120 United States v. Alcom, 329 F.3d 759, 767 (10th Cir. 2003).
121 Id. at 765; Gilbert v. Mullin, 302 F.3d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538
U.S. 1004 (2003).
122 Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 611 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1054
(2000); see also United States v. Burgos, 55 F.3d 933, 936-37 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Two circuits have rejected Allen. In United States v. Fioravanti, the Third Circuit
called the Allen charge discredited and fraught with "treachery,"1 23 and it held that
any Allen instructions given to a jury would be automatic grounds for reversal. 24 It
reasoned that the dynamite charge violated the jury's "exclusive province" of deter-
mining guilt or innocence by coercing a verdict.125 The court of appeals further held
that any supplemental charge must be carefully crafted and must avoid any language
that encourages specific jurors to reconsider their views during deliberations. 26 In
place of the Allen charge, the Third Circuit allowed the use of a supplemental instruc-
tion with innocuous language that merely urged jurors to "consult with one another"
but never "surrender [their] honest conviction as to the weight ... of evidence."' 127
In United States v. Thomas, the District of Columbia Circuit replaced the Allen
charge with the standards crafted by the ABA.'28 The new instruction makes no
mention of jurors in the minority or majority and urges jurors to weigh the evidence
presented at trial but never surrender their honestly held beliefs. 129 Like the Third
Circuit's charge, the D.C. Circuit retains little of the language from the original
Allen charge.
123 412 F.2d 407, 417 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969).
124 Id. at 420 ("But hereafter this court will not let a verdict stand which may have been
influenced in any way by an Allen Charge."); see also United States v. Burley, 460 F.2d 998,
999 (3d Cir. 1972) (holding that a supplemental instruction to deadlocked jury which made
mention of the expense of a new trial was coercive). But see United States v. West, 877 F.2d
281, 291 (4th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 959 (1989) (holding trial judge's reference
to the expense of a retrial was improper but not grounds for reversal of conviction).
25 Fioravanti, 412 F.2d at 417.
126 Id. at 420.
127 Id. at 420 n.32.
128 449 F.2d 1177, 1184-86 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
129 See United States v. Dorsey, 865 F.2d 1275, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 492
U.S. 924 (1989). In Dorsey, the court of appeals found that the given supplemental instruction
was not coercive and borrowed from the ABA's own suggested instruction:
The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror.
In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree thereto.
Your verdict must be unanimous.
It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to delib-
erate with a view to reaching an agreement, if you can do so without
violence to individual judgment. Each of you must decide the case for
yourself, but do so only after an impartial consideration of the evidence
with your fellow jurors. In the course of your deliberations, do not hesi-
tate to reexamine your own views and change your opinion if convinced
it is erroneous. But do not surrender your honest conviction as to the
weight or effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your fellow
jurors, or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
You are not partisans. You are judges-judges of the facts. Your
sole interest is to ascertain the truth from the evidence in the case.
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In sum, most circuits have gone to considerable lengths to sanitize supplemental
instructions given to hung juries. As a result, guidelines have been crafted that do
little to help break deadlocks in criminal trials, while their many exceptions, caveats,
restrictions, and requirements only further litter the jurisprudence with confusing
case law.
At the other extreme, some circuits continue to use the dynamite charge in a
form very close to the original approved by the Supreme Court in 1896. The Second
Circuit has issued opinions in the last decade reaffirming dedication to the original
Allen charge. 30 In United States v. Melendez, the Second Circuit held that Allen was
still applicable, despite vociferous objections by the defendant. 31 Recently, the Second
Circuit expanded on its reading in Melendez, ruling that an Allen charge would only
be grounds for reversal when it was coercive, with coercion being determined by a
"totality of the circumstances" test.
32
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has approved a version very close to the original Allen
charge for use by its courts. 133 One approved charge tells a deadlocked jury that "[t]he
trial has been expensive in time, effort, and money to both the defense and the prose-
cution."' 34 It then notes that if the jury cannot come to a verdict, the matter would
be "left open and must be tried again."' 35 While most circuits would surely find this
language coercive because it makes jurors feel as though they must come to a verdict,
the Fifth Circuit has upheld these instructions on several occasions.' 36 In fact, one
Fifth Circuit opinion even spoke of "Allen's age-old wisdom."'
37
The wildly varying approaches of the federal courts of appeal suggest that there
is simply no federal law about how to charge deadlocked juries. The states are equally
varied in their approaches.
130 See United States v. Crispo, 306 F.3d 71 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Melendez,
60 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1995).
'3' 60 F.3d at 52.
132 Crispo, 306 F.3d at 77. The Second Circuit's view is in seeming accordance with the
Supreme Court's test established in Jenkins. See Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445,446
(1965) (holding that trial court actions would be judged "in [their] context and under all the
circumstances" to determine if coercion was present).
13' COMM. ON PATrERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS DIST. JUDGES Ass'N FIFTH CIRcurr, PATrERN
JURY INSTRUCTIONS (CRIMINAL CASES) § 1.45 (2001).
134 id.
131 Id.; see also United States v. Diggs, 522 F.2d 1310, 1321 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 852 (1976).
136 See United States v. Redd, 355 F.3d 866, 877 (5th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct.
306 (2006); United States v. Winters, 105 F.3d 200, 203-04 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
528 U.S. 969 (1999); Boyd v. Scott, 45 F.3d 876, 883 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S.
1111 (1995).
137 United States v. Straach, 987 F.2d 232, 243 (5th Cir. 1993).
9132007]
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
2. State Courts and Allen Dynamite
Like the federal circuits, some states have banned the charge outright, others have
crafted their own modified charges, and some have retained the dynamite charge in
its nearly original language from 1896. For the most part, however, the states have
stopped using Allen for the same reasons many of the federal circuits have aban-
doned it. There has been a pronounced drive in many states to adopt the ABA's sug-
gested standards for supplemental instructions and scrap the old Allen charge. By
one commentator's count, almost half of the states have integrated the ABA standards
either partially or completely into their own hung jury instructions. 38
The standards suggested by the ABA make several changes to the Allen charge.
They advocate a supplemental charge that does not specifically address any particu-
lar jurors-whether they are in the minority or majority of the deadlocked panel-
but rather speaks to the panel generally. 39 The ABA standards emphasize that no
juror should abandon his or her "honest conviction[s].""4 Finally, and perhaps most
importantly, the ABA instruction is to be given, not when deadlock is first encoun-
tered, but instead right before the start of deliberations.' 4' This last requirement en-
sures, at least in the ABA's eyes, that there is no coercion by making jury members
think that they must come to a verdict.
There are a large number of permutations to the charges given to deadlocked
juries today. The permutations include differences not only in the language and
structure of the charge but also the time that it is given,' the number of times that
it can be given, 43 whether it can be given if the jury informs the judge of its exact
numerical breakdown, 44 and even if it can be given without counsel present at the
138 Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Instructions Urging Dissenting Jurors in State Criminal
Case to Give Due Consideration to Opinion of Majority (Allen Charge)-Modern Cases,
97 A.L.R.3D 96, 108-09 (1980).
139 Id. at 102.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See People v. Morrison, 532 N.E.2d 1077, 1090 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988).
43 See United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1299 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502
U.S. 938 (1991); Palanti v. Dillon Enters., Ltd., 707 N.E.2d 695,701-02 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999)
(holding that the giving of multiple instructions to the jury was not error per se).
' See United States v. Parsons, 993 F.2d 38, 41-42 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 898 (1993); United States v. Gambino, 951 F.2d 498, 500-02 (2d Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 504 U.S. 918 (1992); United States v. Armstrong, 654 F.2d 1328, 1333 (9th Cir.
1981) ("Mere revelation of the numerical division of ajury, although to be discouraged, does
notcompel a mistrial."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1157 (1982); State v. Fowler, 322 S.E.2d 389,
392-93 (N.C. 1984) (finding that it was not error for the judge to know the numerical
breakdown of the deadlocked jury). But see United States v. Samuel Dunkel & Co., 173 F.2d
506, 510-11 (2d Cir. 1949) (holding that inquiry into the jury's division was per se error);
People v. Talkington, 47 P.2d 368, 372 (Cal. Ct. App. 1935) (holding that it is per se error for
the judge to inquire of the deadlocked jury's numerical breakdown), overruled by People v.
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time. 145 These variations are just some of the more prominent modifications state
courts have made to their deadlocked jury instructions. We will not attempt a
precise catalogue of all of them.
Alaska has rejected the use of the dynamite charge, replacing it with the ABA
standards."4  California,'47 Colorado, 148 Hawaii, 49 Illinois,' 50 Louisiana,' New
Jersey,'52 and Ohio 53 have banned the original Allen charge, replacing it with a
heavily modified version or an instruction patterned after the ABA's suggested ele-
ments. 54 Each of these states has abandoned Allen out of concern that it coerces
Friend, 327 P.2d 97 (Cal. 1958). See generally 75B AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1583 (1992) (explain-
ing that some courts find the inquiry to be permissible while others do not).
145 See United States v. Neff, 10 F.3d 1321, 1324 (7th Cir. 1993); United States v. Cowan,
819 F.2d 89, 93 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Ronder, 639 F.2d 931, 934 (2d Cir. 1981);
State v. Estrada, 738 P.2d 812, 828 (Haw. 1987). But see United States v. Hernandez, 146
F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 1998).
146 Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831,842 (Alaska 1971). Alaska had formally embraced Allen
in Chase v. State, 369 P.2d 997, 1005 (Alaska 1962). See also 75B AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1589
(2004).
147 People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997, 1009 (Cal. 1977) (stipulating that the Allen charge
"'should never again be read in a California courtroom"').
148 People v. Schwartz, 678 P.2d 1000,1012 (Colo. 1984) (endorsing modified supplemental
charge that urges jurors not to give up honest opinion); People v. Watson, 53 P.3d 707, 713
(Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (providing a modified instruction that instructs jurors that (1) they
should try to reach a unanimous verdict, (2) each juror should consider the evidence impartially
and consider it with other panelists, (3) they should not hesitate to re-examine their views if
necessary, and (4) they should not surrender their honest beliefs just to return a verdict).
141 State v. Fajardo, 699 P.2d 20, 25 (Haw. 1985) ("'We are convinced that the evils far
outweigh the benefits, and decree that [the use of the Allen instruction] shall no longer be
tolerated and approved by this court."' (modification in original)).
"0 People v. Prim, 289 N.E.2d 601,606-10 (IlL. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 918 (1973).
See generally 14B ILL. LAW & PRAC. CRIMINAL LAW § 770 (1999) (detailing the "Prim in-
struction"); John F. Decker, Post-Instruction Issues: Jury Deliberations and Verdict, 34 LOY.
U. CHI. L.J. 569, 591-95 (2003) (explaining the Prim instruction).
'' State v. Nicholson, 315 So. 2d 639, 641 (La. 1975) ("[W]e henceforth ban the use of
the 'Allen charge' and of any coercive modification thereof in the courts of Louisiana.").
152 State v. Czachor, 413 A.2d 593,598 (N.J. 1980) ("We come to the conclusion that the
Allen charge conveys both blunt and subtle pressure upon the jury, pressure which is incon-
sistent with jury freedom and responsibility. Such a charge does not permit jurors to deliberate
objectively, freely, and with an untrammeled mind. We accordingly hold that such a charge
containing coercive features should not be given to a jury in the trial of a criminal case.").
' State v. Howard, 537 N.E.2d 188, 192-95 (Ohio 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 873 (1989).
'54 Several states have expressly scrapped the Allen charge. See State v. Flint, 761 P.2d
1158, 1162-65 (Idaho 1988); Lewis v. State, 424 N.E.2d 107, 111 (Ind. 1987) (requiring that
when deadlock is encountered, the judge can order further deliberations but must also reread
all of the final instructions to thejury); State v. White, 285 A.2d 832,837-38 (Me. 1972) (recom-
mending ABA standards and charge for Maine courts); People v. Sullivan, 220 N.W.2d 441,
450 (Mich. 1974) (holding that any supplemental instructions to deadlocked jury must be in
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jurors into reaching a unanimous verdict. This mass rejection of Allen is well
illustrated by the courts in California and Michigan. The California Supreme Court
scrapped Allen and any variations of it, finding that the decision was a relic that in-
herently coerced jurors.'55 Similarly, the Michigan Supreme Court held that any sub-
stantial variation from the ABA instruction would be automatic grounds for reversal.'56
Other states allow more leeway. In Alabama, for example, the dynamite charge
can be used by criminal trial judges so long as the language of the instruction is not
threatening. 57 In Arkansas, judges can administer an Allen charge and even make
reference to the potential cost of a retrial, 58 as well as inquire of the foreperson as to
the deadlocked jury's numerical breakdown.'59 Similarly, Connecticut's version of
the Allen charge has been upheld despite its language that urges jurors in the minority
to reconsider their views.' ° Texas has done the same.16 ' Giving the charge multiple
times is also fair game in several states. 162 But these states are in the distinct minority
in their support of Allen.
Perhaps the only thing that all of the states have in common is that each of their
instructions includes language that cautions jurors not to acquiesce during delib-
erations. While finding one's way through the modem Allen forest is exceedingly
difficult, the ABA standards have not helped. When first created, these standards were
accordance with the ABA instruction); State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d 765, 772 (Minn. 1973)
("We hold now that use of the Allen charge shall be discontinued in Minnesota and the
procedures set forth in A.B.A. Standards... are adopted for the trial courts in this state.");
Sharplin v. State, 330 So. 2d 591,596 (Miss. 1976) ("[T]he 'Allen Charge' in any of its various
forms should not be given."); State v. Garza, 176 N.W.2d 664,666-67 (Neb. 1970); Wilkins
v. State, 609 P.2d 309, 312-13 (Nev. 1980); State v. Blake, 305 A.2d 300, 306 (N.H. 1973);
State v. Alston, 243 S.E.2d 354,364-67 (N.C. 1978); Commonwealth v. Spencer, 275 A.2d 299,
303-05 (Pa. 1971); State v. Patriarca, 308 A.2d 300,320-23 (R.I. 1973); State v. Ferguson,
175 N.W.2d 57, 59-61 (S.D. 1970); Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975); Hoskins
v. State, 552 P.2d 342 (Wyo. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977). Other states have
merely recommended the use of the ABA charge. See Winters v. United States, 317 A.2d
530, 532-34 (D.C. 1974); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 300 N.E.2d 192, 200-02 (Mass.
1973); State v. Perry, 306 A.2d 110, 112 (Vt. 1973).
' People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997, 1004-05, 1009 (Cal. 1977).
156 Sullivan, 220 N.W.2d at 450. Maryland adopted a similar approach, finding that a trial
court committed reversible error when it gave a modified version of the Allen charge instead
of the preferred ABA instruction. See Bumette v. State, 371 A.2d 663, 666-69 (Md. 1977).
117 Maxwell v. State, 828 So. 2d 347, 365 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000), cert. denied, 535 U.S.
951 (2002).
158 Griffin v. State, 617 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Ark. Ct. App. 1981); see also Wright v. State, 553
S.E.2d 787,789 (Ga. 2001); Freeman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
'5 Davis v. State, 892 S.W.2d 472, 474-75 (Ark. 1995).
,6 State v. O'Neill, 511 A.2d 321 (Conn. 1986).
161 See 8 TEX. PRAC., CRIMINAL FORMs AND TRIAL MANUAL § 99.33 (11 th ed. 2006).
162 See Jones v. State, 505 S.E.2d 749, 753-54 (Ga. 1998). But see Washington v. State,
758 So. 2d 1148, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that it is per se reversible error to
give a supplemental instruction twice to a deadlocked jury).
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seen as a solution to Allen's perceived deficiencies. However, as we have demon-
strated, the ABA standards have only further clouded the Allen issue. Instructions
to deadlocked juries are still routinely challenged as coercive by defendants. The
cases we have surveyed are just the veritable tip of the doctrinal iceberg. They repre-
sent only some of the different instructions state criminal courts use in instructing
deadlocked juries today.
Confusing? Undoubtedly. A Gordian knot? Considering the law in the United
States as a whole, it is certainly twisted quite thoroughly. Of course, in any individual
jurisdiction, as long as the judge sticks to the charge that the highest court has ap-
proved, he or she can follow a rule as to the content of the charge. The difficulty is
that no jurisdiction has clear rules about how many times the charge can be given,
whether it may be varied if it is given again, and how long a jury may be held before
a mistrial is the only, or the best, option.
Thus, even trial judges who give the prescribed instruction face an uncertain fate
in the hands of appellate courts if the first charge does not work. Judges do not like
to be reversed, of course, and the net effect of the uncertainty here is that judges usually
do not give the charge more than once or twice. The judicial reluctance to keep juries
deliberating results in more mistrials. How much do these additional mistrials harm
the system?
F. Assessing the Hung Jury Problem on the Ground
Although there are few studies on the frequency of hung juries in American courts
today, the existing data do not reveal a crisis. 6 3 The data do show, however, suffi-
cient hung juries in state and federal courts to justify seeking a remedy to reduce the
number. Moreover, while the Double Jeopardy Clause permits a retrial following
a hung jury," retrials are expensive. In many jurisdictions, a trial can cost around
$10,000 per day. 165 One must also take into account the emotional toll that retrials
163 Nevertheless, in recent years, in the wake of several high-profile mistrials, hung juries
have received considerable coverage by the news media. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, In Jury
Rooms, a Form of Civil Protest Grows, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1999, at A1; Carrie Johnson,
Judge Declares Mistrial in Tyco Case, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2004, at A1; Seth Mydans, The
Other Menendez Trial, Too, Ends with the Jury Deadlocked, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at Al;
Jeffrey Rosen, One Angry Woman: Why Are Hung Juries on the Rise?, NEW YORKER, Feb.
24 & March 3, 1997, at 54 (discussing the trend of black women on juries deadlocking
criminal trials of young black defendants in the District of Columbia).
"6 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824), is understood today to stand for
the proposition that double jeopardy is not violated when a mistrial is granted because of a
hung jury. One of us has argued that Justice Story's opinion in Perez has been misunderstood.
See George C. Thomas III, Solving the Double Jeopardy Mistrial Riddle, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
1551 (1996). But the understanding, or misunderstanding, is settled law today.
65 Dwayne Bray, Prosecutors Seek Change in Jury Voting, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1995,
at B 1.
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pose for criminal victims as well as their families. It is therefore not surprising that
one study found a retrial rate of only twenty-five percent.166 Thus, relying on retrials
to solve the hung jury problem is a poor solution. A better solution would be to
reduce the number of mistrials.
The best and most recent study of hung juries was conducted by the National
Center for State Courts (NCSC). 167 The NCSC looked at criminal felony trials in all
the federal district courts 6 8 from 1980 to 1997, using information provided by the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts. 69 The NCSC found that federal
criminal juries hung at a rate of approximately 2.54% between 1980 and 1997.170 The
study showed that the rates were uniformly low among the twelve federal circuits,
with one exception: the District of Columbia Circuit.' 7 1 Criminal jury trials that ended
in deadlock in federal courts in the D.C. Circuit occurred at a rate of 9.5%. 172 No other
circuit exceeded 3.1% during any one year in that three-year period.
173
The NCSC also examined hung jury rates in the states. However, because of the
sheer volume of criminal jury trials that are conducted in the states every year, the
authors used the thirty most populated counties from 1996 to 1998.174 The NCSC
'66 PLANNING & MGMT. CONSULTING CORP., EMPIRICAL STUDY OF FREQUENCY OF
OCCURRENCE CAUSES EFFECTS AND AMOUNT OF TIME CONSUMED BY HUNG JURIES 4-30 to
4-37 (1975) [hereinafter PLANNING & MGMT. STUDY].
167 See infra note 171. In addition to the NCSC study, there have been other notable studies
on hung jury rates. The first was THE AMERICAN JURY, which found that mistrials resulting
from hung juries occurred in approximately 5.5% of all criminal cases in the United States.
HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 56 (1966). Another, conducted
by the Planning and Management Consulting Corporation, studied the rate of hung juries in
California courts. It found that between 1971 and 1973, the average rate of hung juries in
California's ten biggest counties was over twelve percent. PLANNING & MGMT. STUDY, supra
note 166, at 4-6. On the whole, however, there have been few studies that have examined
the rate of hung juries in American courtrooms.
168 As of January 2005, there were 665 federal district judges in the United States. See
Alliance for Justice.org, About Judicial Selection Project-Frequently Asked Questions, http://
www.allianceforjustice.org/judicial/about/frequently.html.
169 PAULA L. HANNAFORD-AGOR ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ARE HUNG
JURIES A PROBLEM? (2002), available at http://www.ncsconline.orgfWC/Publications/Res
_Juries_- HungJuriesProblemPub.pdf.
170 Id. at 22-23 figs. 2.3, 2.4. These statistics are taken from a chart of hung jury rates that
the NCSC authors provide. We estimated the criminal hung jury rates for each year and
averaged them. Therefore, there may be a slight variation between the 2.54% described here
and the actual percentage. However, because the study did not provide the exact percentage,
an estimation was required.
1'' See id. at 23 fig.2.4.
172 Id.
173 Id.
1'4 Id. at 24-25. The authors provide a detailed description of their methodology and how
they researched these statistics. For a full list of the counties studied, with their average number
of criminal jury trials per year and hung jury rates from 1996 to 1998, see id. at 25.
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authors found that between 1996 and 1998, mistrials resulting from deadlock in state
courts occurred at a rate of 6.2%. ' The rates varied dramatically in some cases. For
example, Los Angeles County had a hung jury rate of almost 15%, and New York
County had a 9% rate.'7 6
Is a mistrial rate that ranges from 2.5% to 15% a significant problem? A 15%
hung jury rate must be burdensome to the California court system. However burden-
some the hung jury rate is to a particular jurisdiction, it is so easy to solve the problem
that courts should cut the hung jury Gordian knot. We explain how in the next part.
III. CUTTING THE GORDIAN KNOT
Given the wide disparity in the permitted charges, the lack of guidance on how
many times a charge can be given, and how long a jury can be kept in deliberation,
judicial coercion may well lurk in the various charges that have grown from the
Allen weed. No modern system would permit anything even approaching the kind
of coercion practiced in Bushel's Case.'77 The Supreme Court has held that it is
coercive to tell a jury it has to reach a verdict, and that seems right to us. But what
if there were a type of charge that was almost entirely cleansed of coercion? In that
case, we believe, judges could be trusted to give it as many times as seems helpful.
Is there a largely coercion-free charge? We believe the answer is yes and that
it is an obvious solution. It first seemed odd that no one had thought of this obvious
solution, but the reason is, once again, the Gordian knot. If a legislature took a look
at the problem, our solution would quickly occur to someone involved in finding a
solution. But as the courts labored in the common law vineyard, they wore blinders
that kept them from thinking of a new solution. They took the old cases and pruned
and shaped them but they did not think to start over.
One can start over by returning to Justice Story's 1824 opinion in Perez. Recall
his description of what a trial judge should do when faced with a deadlocked jury: an
order dismissing a jury because it is hung "ought to be used with the greatest caution,
under urgent circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes; and, in capital
cases especially, Courts should be extremely careful how they interfere with any of
the chances of life, in favour of the prisoner."'7 8 How can judges be both "extremely
careful how they interfere" and at the same time grant mistrials only "under urgent
circumstances, and for very plain and obvious causes"? The answer, we believe, is
to ask the jury to keep trying, not to give up, to keep talking about the case.
We have named the suggested procedure the "Silent Charge." Of course, the
judge would not literally be silent, but she would be silent about the deadlock. It is,
in this sense, a "Silent Charge." It would accomplish three key objectives. First, it
171 Id. at 20, 25.
176 Id. at 25 fig.2.5.
1" See supra notes 27-42 and accompanying text.
178 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
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would do more to break deadlocks than the Allen charge. Rather than torture jury
panels with long-winded instructions,179 the Silent Charge would be clearer, and juries
would likely respond more positively to "please keep trying" than to the current
dynamite charge mush. Second, the new procedure would cut through the Gordian
knot of confusing Allen law, thereby, saving judicial time and resources, especially
on appeals. Third, the new charge would not be plagued by accusations that it coerces
jurors. If implemented correctly, the Silent Charge is no more than an invitation to
continue deliberation. By eliminating court inefficiency and coercion, the Silent
Charge would improve criminal justice administration.
Trial courts today have discretion to send deadlocked juries back for further de-
liberations without any instructions. We believe courts would be much wiser if the
judge discharged this discretion by issuing a Silent Charge that asks the jury simply to
"please continue your deliberations." A handful of state and federal courts have spoken
to this very issue, albeit briefly and somewhat indirectly. In Alabama, for example,
the state's highest criminal court has held that merely instructing a jury to continue
deliberations was not coercive when the jury reported itself deadlocked." 0 Similarly,
the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled that "[m]erely advising a deadlocked jury to con-
tinue deliberations does not, standing alone, constitute coercion or improper conduct
on the part of the trial court."'' The Colorado Court of Appeals has held that a
judge's statement to the deadlocked jury to "continue your deliverations [sic]" was not
coercive,8 2 and the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that asking a hung jury to con-
tinue deliberating was by its very nature not coercive." 3 Other state courts have fol-
lowed suit, upholding the trial judge's ability to order further deliberations without
any accompanying supplemental instructions. 4
There is some case law on point in the federal courts as well. Of all the federal
courts of appeals, the Seventh Circuit has spoken most directly to the permissibility
of merely ordering further deliberations. In United States v. Degraffenried,8 5 the
court examined a trial court's instruction that was challenged as coercive. When the
'7 See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
'10 George v. State, 717 So. 2d 849, 852 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1024 (1998); see also Showers v. State, 407 So. 2d 169, 171 (Ala. 1981) ("It is quite clear
that under Alabama law a trial judge may urge a jury to resume deliberations and cultivate
a spirit of harmony so as to reach a verdict, as long as the court does not suggest which way
the verdict should be returned and no duress or coercion is used.").
l' State v. Webb, 793 P.2d 105, 115 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990); see also State v. Campbell,
706 P.2d 741, 744 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that sending a jury back twice for further
deliberations without instruction was not coercive either).
182 People v. Farley, 712 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
183 People v. France, 461 N.W.2d 621, 632-33 (Mich. 1990).
'84 See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.31 nn.7-8 (Vernon 2006); Cavendish v.
State, 496 N.E.2d 46,47 (Ind. 1986); State v. Jones, 556 N.W.2d 903,911-12 (Minn. 1996);
McKnight v. State, 738 So. 2d 312, 321 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999); State v. Leroy, 724 S.W.2d
277, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); State v. Long, 294 S.E.2d 4, 11 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982).
185 339 F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2003).
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jury reported itself deadlocked, the judge told the panel "[m]embers of the jury, I've
read your note. Please continue deliberations."'' 8 6 The Seventh Circuit found that
this instruction carried "no plausible potential for coercing 'the jury to surrender their
honest opinions."
8 7
The ABA standards permit a court to "require the jury to continue their delib-
erations" when it is unable to agree. 8 The ABA notes that ordering further delib-
erations is acceptable so long as "the court does not threaten to require the jury to
deliberate an unreasonable length of time or for unreasonable periods."'
8 9
To be sure, an occasional court 9° or commentator 9' has argued that merely re-
questing further deliberations can be coercive. But these puzzling objections fail to
take note of the historic, thousand-year-old duty of juries to reach a verdict. All that
is generally required to keep the jury deliberating is that the judge believe that there
is still a reasonable probability of an unanimous verdict.192 As long as a reasonable
probability exists, the Silent Charge cannot, in our view, be viewed as coercive.
The question that then remains is how many times a judge can order further de-
liberations in a given trial? Once is obviously fine, but what about two times, three
times, or more? This of course cannot be answered in the abstract.' 93 The judge
should naturally consider the complexity of the issues presented in the case and the
time the jury has spent deliberating prior to declaring itself hung. But we think it un-
wise to cap the number of times the judge can ask the jury to continue deliberations.
186 Id. at 580.
187 Id. (quoting United States v. D'Antonio, 801 F.2d 979, 983-84 (7th Cir. 1986)); see
also United States v. Kramer, 955 F.2d 479, 489 (7th Cir. 1992) ("The relevant inquiry...
is 'whether "the court's communications pressured the jury to surrender their honest opin-
ions for the mere purpose of returning a verdict .... (quoting United States v. Thibodeaux,
758 F.2d 199, 203 (7th Cir. 1985))), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 998 (1992).
188 3 ABA STANDARDS FORCRIMINALJUSTICE, supra note 87, § 15-4.4(b), at 15-133. The
commentary to this standard further holds that "a court may send the jury back for additional
deliberations even though the jury has indicated once, twice, or several times that it cannot
agree or even after jurors have requested that they be discharged," Id. at 15-135; see also State
v. Kelley, 517 N.W.2d 905,909 (Minn. 1994); State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d 765,772 (Minn.
1973). It is important to note that the ABA, of course, distinguishes between ordering further
instructions and giving a hung jury an Allen charge.
189 People v. Cook, 342 N.W.2d 628,630 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983) (providing section 5.4(b)
of the ABA's standard jury instructions).
'90 Goodwin v. State, 717 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
'9' Deadlocked Juries, supra note 85, at 393 n.37 ("The jurors naturally look to the court
for approval and encouragement. Sending a jury back for additional deliberation in silence
could be interpreted as an act of impatience of disapproval, and might intimidate a juror as
effectively as would an urgent order from the court to come to immediate agreement.").
192 See People v. Pride, 833 P.2d 643,686 (Cal. 1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 935 (1993);
21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 402 (1998).
193 See People v. Andrews, 486 N.Y.S.2d 428,430 (App. Div. 1985) ("Where a trial court
is faced with a deadlocked jury, there is no precise formula to determine exactly how many
times to send the jury back or how long the jury should deliberate.").
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Obviously, if a judge sends a jury back for further deliberations a dozen times, the
likelihood of reversal is vastly increased. However, it is a matter that should be gener-
ally left to thejudge's discretion.'94 To fully appreciate the breadth of the trial judge's
discretion, one need look no further than to the wise words of Justice Story in United
States v. Perez:
We think . . the law has invested Courts of justice with the
authority to discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever,
in their opinion, taking all the circumstances into consideration,
there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public jus-
tice would otherwise be defeated. They are to exercise a sound
discretion on the subject; and it is impossible to define all the cir-
cumstances, which would render it proper to interfere 95
Following Justice Story, if a jury tells the judge that it is hopelessly deadlocked after
an hour of deliberation or if the case is particularly complex, the judge should be free
to ask the deadlocked panel more than once to continue deliberating.'96
We wish to be clear that the use of the Silent Charge would not preclude other
supplemental instructions to a deadlocked jury. Often, juries send notes to the judge
during deliberations, asking questions regarding the evidence, the appropriate law,
and other matters. A trial court should respond to specific jury questions as it sees
fit and the law dictates. But this is another realm of law entirely, with different con-
siderations from those raised by charges to deadlocked juries.
We came across only three studies that suggest the same approach to the instruc-
tion problem as this Article recommends, and all of them reject the idea on grounds
that sending the jury back for more deliberation is futile because deadlocked juries
need instruction from the trial judge.' 97 This argument conflates specific jury questions
about the law, which the judge should answer as noted above, with the problem that
the jury is deadlocked because its members disagree about whether the accused did
what he is charged with doing. No instruction on the law is going to move jurors who
simply disagree about whether the accused committed the crime. Therefore, when
194 See 75B AM. JUR. 2D Trial § 1648, 422-25 (1992); H.H. Hansen & D.E. Buckner,
Annotation, Time Jury May Be Kept Together on Disagreement in Criminal Case, 93 A.L.R.2D
627, §§ 4-6, 8 (1964).
'9' United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580 (1824).
196 Indeed, the time necessary to show coercion varies between jurisdictions. See State v.
Keeler, 316 A.2d 782,783 (Conn. 1972); Edlin v. State, 523 So. 2d 42,45 (Miss. 1988), cert.
denied, 489 U.S. 1086 (1989); State v. Burroughs, 556 S.E.2d 339, 344 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001);
Trial, Influences on the Jury, 32 GEO. L.J. ANN. REv. CRIM. PRo. 513,529-30 n. 1675 (2003)
(reviewing case law as to this issue).
197 See Marcus, supra note 85, at 638; Deadlocked Juries, supra note 85, at 393 n.37;
H.B.B., Jr., Comment, Criminal Procedure-Jury Instructions-ABA StandardAdoptedfor
Instructing Deadlocked Juries, 42 TENN. L. REv. 803, 814 (1975).
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a jury announces itself deadlocked and "groping" 98 with the questions of factual guilt,
the court should just leave it to continue its debate in hopes of ultimately coming to
a unanimous verdict without resorting to a long-winded instruction.
We believe that the Silent Charge would be more effective in breaking jury dead-
lock than any of the currently used dynamite charges Admittedly, there is no em-
pirical evidence to prove this contention.'" But even a cursory glance at the original
Allen charge reveals its complex and confusing nature. It encourages jurors to debate
and discuss and never give up their honestly held views, but it does not encourage
much else. The modem versions are worse. At the risk of boring the reader to death,
we reprint a typical modem Allen charge:
I am going to instruct you to go back and resume your delib-
erations. I will explain why and give you further instructions.
In trials absolute certainty can be neither expected nor attained.
You should consider that you are selected in the same manner
and from the same source as any future jury would be selected.
There is no reason to suppose that this case would ever be sub-
mitted to 12 men and women more intelligent, more impartial or
more competent to decide it than you, or that more or clearer evi-
dence would be produced in the future: Thus, it is your duty to
decide the case if you can conscientiously do so without violence
to your individual judgment.
The verdict to which a juror agrees must, of course, be his or
her own verdict, the result of his or her own convictions, and not
a mere acquiescence in the conclusion of his or her fellow jurors.
Yet, in order to bring 12 minds to a unanimous result, you must
examine the questions submitted to you with an open mind and
with proper regard for, and deference to, the opinion of your fel-
low jurors.
In conferring together you ought to pay proper respect to each
other's opinions and you ought to listen with a mind open to being
convinced by each other's arguments. Thus, where there is dis-
agreement, jurors favoring acquittal should consider whether a
198 People v. Prim, 289 N.E.2d 601, 608 (Ill. 1972) ("[W]e do not feel that a jury should be
left to grope in such circumstances without some guidance from the court."). See supra note
85 (nearly every article argues thatAllen is coercive and endorses using the ABA standards).
199 However, the effectiveness of the Allen charge itself has been a subject of some exami-
nation. One study that examined Allen's effectiveness found that Allen is useful in creating
jury unanimity but that it is coercive. Saul M. Kassin et al., The Dynamite Charge: Effects
on the Perceptions andDeliberation Behavior of Mock Jurors, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 537,
547-49 (1990); see also Mark M. Lanier & Cloud Miller III, The Allen Charge: Expedient
Justice or Coercion?, 25 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 31 (2001) (arguing that Allen is generally effective
in helping break hung juries).
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doubt in their own mind is a reasonable one when it makes no
impression upon the minds of the other equally honest and intel-
ligent jurors who have heard the same evidence with the same
degree of attention and with the same desire to arrive at the truth
under the sanction of the same oath.
On the other hand, jurors favoring conviction ought seriously
to ask themselves whether they should not distrust the weight or
sufficiency of evidence which fails to dispel reasonable doubt in
the minds of their fellow jurors.
Not only should jurors in the minority re-examine their posi-
tions, but jurors in the majority should do so also, to see whether
they have given careful consideration and sufficient weight to the
evidence that has favorably impressed the persons in disagree-
ment with them.
Burden of proof is a legal tool for helping you decide. The law
imposes upon the prosecution a high burden of proof. The prose-
cution has the burden to establish, with respect to each count, each
essential element of the offense, and to establish that essential ele-
ment beyond a reasonable doubt. And if with respect to any ele-
ment of any count you are left in reasonable doubt, the defendant
is entitled to the benefit of such doubt and must be acquitted.
It is your duty to decide the case, if you can conscientiously
do so without violence to your individual judgment. It is also your
duty to return a verdict on any counts as to which all of you agree,
even if you cannot agree on all counts. But if you cannot agree,
it is your right to fail to agree.
I now instruct you to go back and resume your deliberations.2°°
This modified supplemental charge is longer and more confusing than the original
Allen charge. It is almost living proof of the overgrowth of law that Justice Jackson
highlighted in Douglas2°' and that we have analyzed in this Article. Rather than con-
fuse and bore jurors, how much simpler to ask them to keep deliberating. That, they
will understand. A deadlocked jury that is sent back once, twice, perhaps three times
or more would have an incentive to reach a unanimous verdict.22 Thus, a Silent
Charge would likely be more effective than Allen, as well as less coercive.
200 United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 135 F.3d 193, 194-95 n.2 (lst Cir. 1998); see also
United States v. Seawell, 550 F.2d 1159, 1161 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977) (approving supplemental
charge of 974 words), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 991 (1978). See generally IA O'MALLEY, supra
note 106, § 20.08.
201 Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
202 Of course, there are those who think the Allen charge is very effective at breaking dead-
locks, including prosecutors. See Mark Hansen, AllAbout Allen: Judges' Charge to Deadlocked
Juries Comes Under Scrutiny, 87 A.B.A.J. 24 (2001).
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The power to issue Silent Charges has existed at least since 1824.203 It did not
flourish as did theAllen charge, perhaps because it was too simple for the highly formal
nineteenth century courts. Once the Allen idea was firmly planted in the common law
soil, it was almost inevitable that it would become a Gordian knot. With so many vari-
ables and so little guidance from the Supreme Court, the strong likelihood was that
the law would develop in unplanned and idiosyncratic ways. It has. It is time for
courts or the legislatures to cut the Gordian knot. Trial judges should be told to ask
juries to continue deliberating even when they think they are hopelessly deadlocked.
It is a good idea. It is implicit in Justice Story's Perez opinion. It is time to bring back
the wisdom of 1824.
CONCLUSION
For half a century, Allen v. United States has been a lightning rod for criticism.
Implementation of the Silent Charge would erase all of the objections that plague
Allen. The Silent Charge is the best solution to the hung jury Gordian knot because
it allows judges to press the jury to continue deliberating without saying anything
that might push the jurors towards a verdict one way or the other. The Silent Charge
would make the Allen charge unnecessary, thus eliminating virtually all arguments
that judges coerced verdicts out of deadlocked juries.2°4 The Silent Charge recognizes
the broad power of trial judges to control jury deliberations. It is not a dramatic
change in the law but a return to the simpler days of Justice Story.
It seems likely that, beyond cutting the Gordian knot of current law, the Silent
Charge can prevent many mistrials. Moreover, the simplicity of the charge would
radically reduce the flood of appeals based on coercive Allen charge claims. This
would be an unalloyed good for the twenty-first century criminal justice world.
Even if the Silent Charge does nothing to depress the rate of mistrials, it is a vast
improvement over current law. Nearly every state and federal circuit has its own
Allen procedure, with no two being identical. The lack of uniformity combined with
the widespread resistance to Allen from many in the legal community illustrates that
the current procedures are not working. Allen creates more harm than good today.
The knot should be cut.
203 United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824).
24 This is an argument that should not be underestimated. Defendants will often challenge
any tendered Allen charge on coercion grounds in hopes of winning an appeal. The defendant's
challenge in United States v. Sawyers demonstrates this point. 423 F.2d 1335, 1339 (4th Cir.
1970). Although the Fourth Circuit rejected each of the defendant's contentions, the defen-
dant's arguments are illustrative of how any Allen charge can be challenged as coercive, regard-
less of its language, structure or timing. See Leslie Shea Riggsbee, United States v. Burgos:
Balanced Blasting for Deadlocked Juries, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2036, 2041-44 (1996).
2007]
